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 Abstract—This paper aims at building a responsibility model 
based  on  the  concepts  of  Accountability,  Capability  and 
Commitment.  The  model’s  objectives  are  firstly  to  help 
organizations  for  verifying  the  organizational  structure  and 
detecting policy problems and inconsistency. Secondly, the paper 
brings up a conceptual  framework to support organization for 
defining their corporate, security and access control policies. Our 
work provides a preliminary review of the researches performed 
in that field and proposes,  based on the observations, an UML 
responsibility  model  and  a  definition  of  all  its  concepts. 
Thereafter, to propose a formal representation of the model, we 
have selected the suitable language and logic system. The analyze 
highlights that an important variable is whether the responsibility 
is perceived at a user or at a company level
Index  Terms—  Responsibility,  Capability,  Commitment, 
Accountability,  Access  control,  Right  management,  Formal 
system, Security management.
I.INTRODUCTION
t  is  notable  that  nowadays,  the  responsibility  committed 
from a person to perform a task is an aspect that has for a 
long  time  remained  overshadowed  and  that  nevertheless 
appears  to  be  from  a  major  interest.  The  perception  of 
responsibility has often been limited to a combination of rights 
and obligations. However current business (for example in the 
financial  sector)  demonstrates  that  the  moral  aspect  is 
improvable and that taking care of that matter would avoid in 
some  cases  malfunctions  of  the  system.  In  practice, 
responsibility  is  most  often  translated  through  policies.  It 
exists much definition of policy. For our work, we prefer the 
definition of policies from [31] that is Policies are rules that  
governe the choice in behaviour of a system. Security policies  
define what actions are permitted or not permitted for what or  
for whom, and  under what  condition  (…) This  definition is 
interesting it that, even if it is coming from a low level context, 
it  sounds  applicable  to  the  high  level  one  such  as  the 
management.
I
Based upon the above observations, the first objective of that 
paper is to perform a literature review of policy models and 
engineering methods to  identify the main policy’s  concepts. 
From  that  literature  review,  a  model  of  responsibility  is 
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elaborated  and integrates  main responsibility’s concepts and 
main relationships between those concepts. The specificity of 
that  model  is  its  genericity that  permits in the first  hand to 
integrate policies from all abstraction layers of the company, 
e.g.: IT policy are declined from Corporate policy, and in the 
second  hand,  to  be  compatible  to  policy  from  different 
domains  of  the  company.  E.g.:  IT  policy,  organizational 
policy,  or  security  policy.  Finally,  we  introduce  a 
formalization  of  the  concepts  using  logic  system.  The 
formalization  main  objectives  are  to  propose  a  basic  logic 
framework  for  defining  all  concepts  and,  by  using  that 
framework,  verifying  organizational  structure  and  detecting 
policy problems and inconsistency.
Our  work  will  be  based  on  the  hypothesis  that  this 
responsibility  is  composed  by  the  tuple  (Capability, 
Accountability,  Commitment).  Our  previous  work  [2]  has 
introduced principal semantic characteristics about those three 
concepts and has brought formalizing elements using standard 
logics. 
The  work  is  introduced  by  Camerer’s  observations  over 
research in the field of policy. These observations presented in 
the next section provide a precious warning we have to take 
care  for  our  research.  Section  3  reviews  the  concepts  of 
responsibility  in  access  control  models  and  in  engineering 
methods.  Section  4  formalizes  the  responsibility  and  its 
concepts with an UML model and presents the selection of a 
formal system. Section 5 introduces future works around the 
formalization and section 6 concludes.
II.FROM BUSINESS TO SECURITY POLICY
Before going ahead in the literature review, let make a hook 
to understand the analysis made by Camerer [9] on researches 
in business policy and strategy. An important observation in 
his work is that:  « There are at least three symptoms of the  
disease  causing  the  queasy  dissatisfaction  with  policy  
research:
1. Concepts  are  often  ambiguous  and  their  
definitions are not agreed upon;
2. Checklists or theories are rarely tested, and never  
tested directly against competing theories and
3. Theories do not ‘cumulate’ or built upon previous 
theories as they should.
These  three  deficiencies  are  a  result  of  the  way  policy  
research is typically done.”
Camerer explains that policy research should evolve from 
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an inductive to a deductive approach. He argues that induction 
contribute to an unproductive debate about variable definitions 
and to a lack of testability and failure of theory. Unlikely, his 
conviction is that deductive models can express hypotheses in 
a language that is more amenable to progressive debate. This 
point  of  view is  a  precious  warning  we  have  to  take  into 
account before beginning our researcher in that it may prevent 
us to perpetrate the same mistakes. This warning is moreover 
substantial  because  of  the  subjective  character  of  the  moral 
aspect under focus in our research. In his work, Camerer only 
addresses business policy. Therefore, this consideration needs 
to  be  adapted  according to  our  research’s  context  and  it  is 
consequently  necessary  to  clarify  the  relation  that  exists 
between business policies and IT  policies.  Wies [10]  shows 
the links between high and low-level policies. He depicts the 
variation  of  importance  of  the  technology and  the  business 
aspects  when  translating  high-level  onto  low-level  policies. 
High-level policies tend to focus on business aspects whereas 
low-level policies focus on technology aspects. Although they 
are  spread  on  different  abstraction  layers  of  the  policy 
hierarchy,  business  policies  and  IT  policies  should  be 
consistent because both should be derived from (management 
and/or IT) goals and hence embody (management and/or IT) 
strategy’s  aspects.  Rifaut  et  al.  [11]  propose  to  use  Goal-
Oriented  Requirements  Engineering  (GORE)  methods  to 
define goals, strategies and policies. Rifaut explains that these 
methods  can  be  used  to  analyze  and  model  systems  at  all 
organizational  level,  from  business  models  down  to 
architectures, see Fig. 1. He argues that the four artifacts that 
are  objectives,  policies,  strategies  and  indicators  may  be 
globally considered as objectives and that consequently,  low 
level objectives contributes to achieve higher level one. E.g.: 
Having  access  control  management  contributes  to  have  a 
performance IT security and having a performance IT security 
contribute to have a good corporate governance.
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Fig. 1. GORE model for Policy refinement
Based  on  the  previous  assumption  that  there  exist  links 
between policies from different layers, further analysis of the 
literature has been conducted to depict the principal elements 
that compose the policy concept.
III.RESPONSIBILITY LITERATURE REVIEW
It is rapidly observable when analyzing policy literature that a 
very large  amount of  authors  show interest  in that  concern. 
Consequently,  a  number  of  surveys  have  already  been 
produced in that domain [15][17][18] and [19] but none has 
targeted  the  responsibility  through  the  tuple  (Capability, 
Accountability, Commitment).
Despite that proliferation of works, it is noteworthy that 
up to  now there  does  not  really exist  a  distinction between 
works  addressing  access  control  model,  policy  model,  role 
engineering and permission/policy engineering. Based on that 
assumption, it appears meaningful for apprehending that topic 
to  clarify this point  and to  highlight the existing dichotomy 
between model and method. To perform our review, we will 
base our analysis on a commonly accepted idea that a model or 
conceptual  model  is  a  representation  designed  to  show the 
structure of a system or concept and that (at least in our case), 
a method is a body of techniques for collecting data necessary 
to  instantiate  the  conceptual  model.  Consequently  and  as 
illustration, the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [1] 
proposes  a  structure  for  providing  access  based  on  role 
whereas role engineering [3]  and [4]  is  a method aiming to 
define roles to  instantiate  the conceptual  model.  Identically, 
policy may also be modeled and there exists a proliferation of 
methods  to  instantiate  it.  These  methods  may be  classified 
according to the technique they use. We propose to start with 
methods  based  on  Requirements  Engineering  (RE)  and  to 
continue with a list of others. Moreover, it is more frequent to 
read paper targeting policy language than policy model. Those 
policy languages are innumerable and spread over the entire 
organizational model layers. Most famous of them are Ponder 
[5],  Policy  Description  Language  [6],  Security  Policy 
Language [7], and Rei [8]. Amazingly, the policy model used 
to  support  the  policy  expression  by  the  policy  language 
remains rarely specified. This review presents successively the 
responsibility through access control models and engineering 
methods. The components of the responsibility s tuple are :
•Capability  :  which  describes  the  quality  of  having  the 
requisite  qualities  or  accesses  to  resources  to  achieve  a 
task;
•Accountability  :  which  describes  the  state  of  being 
answerable about the achievement of a task;
•Commitment  : which is the engagement of a stakeholder to 
fulfil a task and the assurance he will do it.
These  definitions  are  refined  through  the  description  of 
these concepts in section 4. 
Responsibility in the field of IT has already been investigated 
because of IT security constraints and requirements firstly, and 
of  software  requirement  engineering  secondly.  IT  security 
depicts responsibility mainly when it addresses access control. 
Indeed,  to  provision employees  with right  and obligation to 
operate  over  an  application  or  a  component,  main  access 
control model use the concept of role to group employee based 
on their responsibility, function, geographic location, domain 
of  work,  etc.  Some  examples  of  those  models  are  the 
Mandatory Access Control, RBAC [10], UCON [11], OrBAC 
[12], etc. However, the inconvenient already observed in large 
company is that the engineering of that roles leads sometime to 
situations where the amount of roles is bigger than the amount 
of employees.
Responsibility has also been subject of research in the field 
of software requirement engineering. Indeed,  this concept is 
centric for a large amount of methods like I*[13].  I* makes 
goal-oriented strategic modeling and analysis of requirements 
by  using  three  mains  concepts  that  are:  actors,  intentional 
elements,  and  links.  Actors  are  described  in  their 
organizational  setting  and  have  attributes  such  as  goals, 
abilities,  beliefs,  and  Commitments.  Actors  can  be  agents, 
roles,  and  positions.  Agents  are  concrete  actors,  systems or 
humans, with specific capabilities. The inconvenient of those 
methods is that they are limited to concepts directly linked to 
the  software  requirement  like  the  right  or  the  obligation 
without  offering  the  possibility  to  be  extended  to  wider 
concepts like the Commitment.
The  state  of  the  art  of  policy concepts  introduces  a  review 
offour  main  recognized  access  control  models:  Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and Usage Control Model 
(UCON).
Our survey has also covered others approaches that due to the 
size of the paper are not presented here. In summary we may 
observe  that  firstly,  some concepts  are  commonly accepted, 
such as right, role and obligation. Definition of the two firsts 
concepts are scarce. Only one definition has been found for the 
concept  of  “right”:  the  right  (or  permission)  is  explicitly 
granted to a subject  to access an object  in a specific mode, 
such as read or write [1]. For the concept of “role”, only one 
definition  has  also  been  found  in  [13].  The  concept  of 
obligation is subject  to more debate.  For Bettini  et al.  [14], 
obligations  are  conditions  or  actions  that  must  be  fulfilled 
either  by  the  users  or  the  system after  a  decision.  In  [1], 
Sandhu et al. define obligations as requirements that have to 
be  fulfilled by the subject  for  allowing access.  Crook et  al. 
[15] extend the notion of obligation to obligation policy that 
relate to actions that must be carried out on targets by subjects 
when a predefined event occurs and Haley et al. in [16] define 
it as what actions must be taken before access can be granted.
TABLE 1. 
AC MODEL AND RESPONSIBILITY’S CONCEPTS
MAC DAC RBAC UCON
Subject Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group No User Group Role Defined by objects and subject’s attributes
Capability Access Right Access Right Access Right Access Right
Accountability
(Obligation, Constraint) No No
Yes, static and dynamic 
separation of duty
Defined by objects and subject’s 
attributes
Commitment No No No No
TABLE 2.
ENGINEERING METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITY’S CONCEPTS.
KAOS I* GBRAM ARMF RACAF Scenario Driven Uses Cases
Subject Agent Actors Agent Users Actors Subject Actors
Object Yes Yes - Asset Data - Object
Group - Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capability (Right, 
Authorzation) Authorization rules
Abilities
and beliefs - Permission Permission Permission Access right
Accountability
(Obligation, Constraint)
Achieve requirements 
and expectations Goal
Achieve
a goal
Perform
a task
Perform
a task
Perform
a scenario
Pre-conditions,
post-conditions
Commitment No Yes No No No No No
Table 2 is a summary and a comparison of the reviewed 
engineering  methods.  We  may observe  that,  because  the 
most  frequently  addressed  concern  of  Capability  is  the 
access right, existing models and methods most of the time 
remain  targeting  low-level  layers  of  abstraction  of  the 
organization. Moreover,  if we consider  responsibility as a 
tuple  (Capability,  Accountability,  Commitment),  we 
observe that  nowadays there exists no model and method 
that  entirely  take  into  account  all  these  responsibility 
components. Other responsibility models exist but are often 
links to  social  or  psychological  areas,  or  in very specific 
domains like [41, 42].
IV.FORMALIZATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
This  chapter  aims  at  defining  a  responsibility  model  to 
clarify  and  better  understand  concepts  that  compose 
responsibility  notion.  To  achieve  that,  we firstly  use  the 
Unified  Modeling  Language  (UML)  to  represent  the 
components of the model and their relations and then, we 
propose  to  introduce  the  formalization  of  its  components 
with formal language and logic system. With the desire to 
keep  this  paper  didactic  and  to  grant  a  common 
understanding of responsibility concepts, the work will be 
grounded based on the following case study:
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Mister  Boss  is  the  manager  of  the  marketing  company 
named  “SelltheWorld”.  Each  year,  Mister  Boss  organizes  
during the Christmas period a large sending of postcards to  
all its customers. This year, Mr Boss has too much work for  
closing  the  annual  report  and  consequently  decides  to  
delegate this task to one of its employees. Because the task is  
less business sensitive as some other production task, Mr Boss  
decides to delegate it to a part-time secretary named Sophie.  
Sophie has just get married and consequently, she accepts this  
additional work without Commitment. Mr Boss asks to the IT  
service manager to give Sophie the necessary access right to  
the customers address list.  The IT service manager asks an  
employee  from  the  IT  service  named  John  to  realize  the  
necessary operation for providing this right. On January the  
30th, Mister Boss receives over 100 complains of customers 
that didn’t receive Christmas card. 
Mr Boss has duly formalized Sophie’s Accountability by  
asking her to realize the sending activity. It was consequently  
clear about what she was accountable to do. To achieve that  
sending, she got the necessary Capability that was the access  
to  the  customers  file.  However,  due  to  the  fact  that  her  
thought went to her new husband rather that to the work to  
accomplish, she didn’t  really want to achieve the work and  
failed  to  assure  her  responsibility  due  to  a  miss  of  
Commitment.
John’s  responsibility  can  also  be  analyzed  by  that  case  
study. John is a well paid IT staff that is very happy with his  
function. He has received clear Accountability to give access  
right to Sophie and he has the needed capabilities due to its  
position as network administrator. He has consequently been  
responsible to fulfill Mr Boss’ request.
A.Responsibility model
This section presents our model of responsibility. The major 
interest  of  it  is its genericity. Indeed,  the model aims to be 
generic enough to be applied to all kind of organizations, at 
each abstraction layers of it, and also for all domains of the 
company  like  for  example  the  IT  security  (and  the 
management  of  access  right),  the  management,  or  the 
production.
Some components of the model are generic in that they are 
present at all instantiations of it. Others components have been 
added  with the  objective  to  illustrate  the  application of  the 
model  in  the  context  of  the  management  of  access  rights. 
Those  components are  Access Right   and  Resource  .  Our 
model reuses some commonly accepted components presented 
in the literature survey in sections 3 and 4, whereas others are 
new. The model encompasses the following concept:
•Organization  : At the top of the UML model (see Fig. 2) is 
the organization.  Organization represents a  structure that 
pursues collective goals and that  is  limited by a defined 
border. This structure encompasses employees (users) that 
are  responsible  to  perform  tasks  (or  processes)  that 
implicitly generate  profit.  Organization also encompasses 
resources  that  could be whether produced by the task or 
used by a user to perform a task.
•User  : User appears as a person external or internal to an 
organization, a system or a software component. User has 
to  achieve  a  task  he  is  responsible  for.  Number  of 
synonyms  of  it  exists  like  subject,  actor  or  agent.  For 
administration  facilities,  those  users  are  often  grouped 
together based on their profile. As previously explained in 
the  literature  overview,  the  most  famous  type  of 
classification is  the  role  but  variations  exist  such as  for 
example  the  team,  the  hierarchy,  or  some  geographical 
constraints. 
Fig. 2. UML model of responsibility applied to the right management
•Role  :  Role  describes  the  position  of  a  person  in  the 
organisation. This position may be related to a hierarchical 
status,  a  geographic  position,  the  membership  to  an 
organisation  unit  or  department,  or  whatever.  This 
component is largely present in the literature that provides 
some definitions of it.
•Responsibility  : It  also exists a plethora of definitions of 
responsibility and this paper has not for duty to propose a 
new one. We may however state that commonly accepted 
responsible definition encompasses the idea of having the 
obligation to ensure that something happens. Moreover, the 
above literature review shows that it makes sense to hang 
on to it the three additional elements that are Capability, 
Accountability  and  Commitment.  One  basic  relation 
existing  in  the  model  is  consequently  the  relationship 
between Responsibility and Capability, Accountability and 
Commitment. This relation is of the form 0..* to 1. That 
means that being responsible involves that it is possible to 
dispose  of  many  Capacities,  Accountabilities  and 
Commitment. But at the opposite, on Commitments is only 
bound  to  one  responsibility,  and  adequately  for 
Accountability and Capability.
•Task  : is the operation performed by the role (or the user), 
which is responsible for it. This concept doesn’t exist in the 
realm of access control  model that tends rather  to speak 
about  right  or/and  obligation  needed  to  perform  an 
operation.  E.g.:  The  right  to  read  a  document  or  the 
obligation  to  satisfy  conditions  before  executing  an 
operation.  By  contrast,  task  is  a  centric  concept  in 
requirement engineering.  E.g.:  in Tropos,  a  goal  may by 
achieve  by  fulfilling  a  task.  The  relation  between  role, 
responsibility and task is to be underlined. This relation is 
to be read: “there is one and only one role responsible for 
one task, and one role may have many responsibilities and 
one responsible may perform many tasks”.
•Accountability  :  is  a  concept  that  exists  mainly  in 
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engineering  methods  and  that  appears  through  the 
obligation to achieve a task or to perform an action. This 
concept describes the state of being answerable about the 
achievement of a task. The case study above illustrates that 
Sophie is accountable toward Mr Boss regarding the task 
she has been assigned responsible for.  In  the same way, 
John is accountable toward the IT manager for providing 
the access right.
•Commitment  : is the moral engagement of a stakeholder to 
fulfil  a  task  and  the  assurance  that  he  will  do  it. 
Commitment  is  the  most  infrequent  concept.  Traditional 
policy model such as RBAC do not address it, however i* 
partly introduces it (e.g. when defining dependency as an 
“agreement” between two actors). However, to distinguish 
if  it  is  a  moral  concept  or  an  obligation  remains 
interpretable.  This  component  is  illustrated  through  the 
cases study as follow: Firstly,  we may state that because 
Sophie has other duty in mind, she has not the willingness 
to achieve the task. We may state that she is not committed 
to do it. At the opposite, John is a well paid IT staff that is 
very happy with his  function.  He  is  fully committed  to 
perform the task.
•Capability  :  which  describes  the  quality  of  having  the 
requisite  qualities,  skills  or  resources  to  perform a  task. 
Capability is a component that is part  of all  models and 
methods,  and  is  most  frequently  declined  through 
definition of access rights, authorizations or  permissions. 
Based  upon  the  above  case  study,  the  Capability  is 
illustrate  through  the  Sophie’s  Capability  to  access  the 
customer’s file.  This Capability exists because John was 
responsible  to  provide  that  access  right.  The  case  study 
illustrates  also  John’s  Capability  to  be  responsible  for 
providing  access  right.  Indeed,  due  to  his  position  of 
network  administrator,  he  has  the  right  to  manage  all 
employees’ access right.
Additionally,  the  UML  model  of  responsibility  (Fig.  2) 
includes two added elements to the basic responsibility model: 
“access  right”  and  “resources”.  These  elements  permit  to 
illustrate the case of a particular type of Capability that is the 
access to resources. We define a resource as something needed 
for or produced by performing a task and that can takes a large 
scale  of  representation  such  like  information,  manpower  or 
money. The access right is defined as a statement over the type 
of action that could be performed by a user over that resource. 
This access right is a Capability for a responsible while being 
at the same time Accountability for another. This relationship 
between Capability, access right and Accountability has been 
more  deeply  explained  in  [2]  and  [36].  In  our  model, 
Capability is a broader concept than the mere one of access 
right.
The advantages of such a model (Fig. 1) are important for 4 
reasons: 
1.  It  permits to improve the business/IT  alignment 
and brings material to answer to the principle 1 of 
the ISO/IEC 38500:2008 standard [40]: Establish 
clearly understood responsibilities for IT.
2.  The  accountability is  bound to  the agent  rather 
than to a group of agents (like in others models 
[39]).  This  makes  the  agent  personally  more 
involved  and  more  concerned  by  the  activity  to 
achieve  because  he  does  not  shared  the  result 
anymore.
3.  It  addresses  the  commitment  aspect  of  the 
responsibility and consequently increases the ethics 
of the business in general.
4.  It guarantees that the right capability is affected to 
the right agent. This advantage guarantees that the 
agents  receive  the  minimum privileges  necessary 
for  achieving their  activities  and consequently,  it 
decreases the vulnerability of the system.
B.Selection of a formal system
Even if this model brings up a first contribution for verifying 
the organization structure and detecting policy problems and 
inconsistency, it  appears impossible to exploit it  without the 
help  of  a  formal  language.  This  section  introduces  a 
preliminary reflection over the selection of that language.
To select  a  language,  we may state  that  the  model  of 
responsibility  formalizes  information  that  represents 
responsibility  elements  in  force  in  the  company.  That 
information composes a system that is part of the real world 
called  the  universe  of  discourse  and  that  encompasses  a 
number of properties (constraints) that the system must satisfy. 
In [38], Meyer at al. explains that some of the constraints may 
not be violated and could be formalized using predicate logic, 
temporal logic or dynamic logic whereas others are violable 
and formalized using deontic logic. The constraint that before 
to  have  access  to  a  file,  it  is  necessary  that  the  right  for 
accessing  the  file  has  been  dully  set  on  the  fileserver  is 
inviolable. Indeed, according to our case study, it is impossible 
that Sophie get access to the customers list if she doesn t have 
the right to read the concerned file. If we consider that read the 
file is a proposition, we can deduce that having the access right 
is a Capability or a modal operator of  read the file .  Some 
others  constraints  are considered  as  ideal  but  violable.  This 
could be illustrate by the responsibility of John that as to set 
the  necessary  access  right  for  Sophie  that  but  due  to  an 
overload of work did not have enough time to achieve it. Time 
is considered in that example as the Capability necessary to 
fulfill the task. John has not assumed is responsibility because 
the statement that John is capable to do it as been violate.
In [33], Cholvy et al. propose a formalization of the concept of 
responsibility. In her work, she explains that responsibility is a 
concept  that  has  several  facets  that  correspond  to  very 
different  meanings.  She  extracts  three  definitions  of 
responsibility,  which  implicitly  encompasses  the  three 
concepts  from  our  model  (Capability,  Accountability, 
Commitment).  The  first  definition  links  the  responsibility 
concept to something bad that has happened to a person that 
could have caused or  prevented it.  This definition is mainly 
issued from the legal world. The second definition issued from 
Cholvy’s paper claims that responsibility is an obligation or a  
moral duty to report or explain the action or someone else’s  
5
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
action  to  a  given  authority  (answerability).  This  definition 
helps at defining the Commitment as a moral duty in parallel 
with an obligation that is considered as a legal duty. The third 
definition defines the responsibility according to a position in 
an  organization  and  explains  that  someone  responsible  for 
something  should  be  prepared  to  justify  his  action.  This 
justification  brings  the  content  of  the  concept  of 
Accountability  and  consequently  nuances  Accountability 
versus answerability. Based upon the three definitions, Cholvy 
proposes a logic framework and explains how the framework 
may be used to model different aspects of the responsibility. 
She used the deontic logic and the logic of actions to achieve 
that. Deontic logic is the field of logic that is concerned with 
obligation (O),  permission (P)  and  prohibition (F),  and that 
permits to reason about ideal versus actual states or behavior.
According to her  approach,  and based  upon the Meyer’s 
explanations  over  the  necessity  to  prefer  deontic  logic  for 
modeling  system  that  encompasses  ideal  but  violable 
properties,  way may rightly  agree  that  Cholvy’s  choose  is 
suitably justified. If we consider the model of responsibility as 
a user based representation of one responsibility, what means 
in other words, that the concepts of responsibility introduced 
in the model represents the responsibility of a unique user to 
perform a unique task, the three components that compose the 
responsibility tuple are violable.  For example,  regarding the 
Capability,  we  may  state  that  based  upon  the  case  study, 
Sophie  must  have  the  list  of  addresses.  However,  it  may 
happen that due to undefined reasons, she doesn’t have it.
If  we expand the sphere of responsibility from a user based 
perception to an organization based perception, this statement 
is  no  more  automatically  true.  Indeed,  if  the  company  is 
considered as a set of tasks, persons, and responsibilities, we 
may suppose that in an ideal situation, it must exist at least one 
Capability,  one  Accountability  and  one  Commitment 
corresponding to each responsibility. 
The  existence  of  Capability  and  Accountability  concepts  is 
easily  manageable  and  verifiable.  Indeed,  it  is  easy  for  an 
operation  or  a  processes  manager  to  determine  the  dully 
capabilities necessary to perform a task or to clearly fix the 
expected accountabilities. Moreover, such concepts are easily 
traceable in a database for example or with a software tool. 
This exercise as already been achieved in previous works [36]. 
The consistency between both concepts may also be examined 
based  upon  the  supposition  that  the  Capability  needed  for 
assuming  a  responsibility  corresponds  to  Accountability  of 
another user’s responsibility. Fig.3 illustrates that links. Based 
upon our cases study, we may consider that :
a) Sophie’s  Capability  (having  access  right)  is  the  
Accountability of John (provides access right).
b) John’s  Capability  (having  time  for  performing  the 
right  management)  is  the  Accountability  of  the  IT  
service manager (provide time the IT service staff)
c) IT  service  manager’s  Capability  (having  budget  to  
hire IT employees) is the Accountability of Mr Boss  
(provide IT service manager budget)
If we base our work on that reasoning that in an ideal situation, 
responsibilities  in  a  company  are  dully  fixed  and  that 
capabilities  and  Accountability exist  for  each  responsibility, 
we may conclude that those two concepts are inviolable and 
may be formalized using predicate logic.
Fig. 3. UML model of multiple responsibilities interactions
While based on our hypotheses that the existence of Capability 
and Accountability is inviolable, the concept of Commitment 
is more likely to discussion. Because this concept is strongly 
depending of the moral willingness, we may argue that no real 
elements  may  absolutely  guarantee  its  inviolability.  This 
affirmation may however be nuanced if we look toward social, 
psychology,  or  managerial  sciences.  The  salary,  the 
relationship  with colleagues,  or  the  concordance  of  the  job 
with  the  interest  of  the  employee  are  some  elements  that 
probably influence it. However, in this paper we consider that 
those  elements  are  not  objectively  manageable  and  do  not 
provide  a  guarantee  of  inviolability.  We  will  consequently 
prefer the usage of deontic logic for formalizing that element. 
We  may  consequently  suppose  that  some  elements  of 
responsibility  may be  formalized  using  predicate  logic  and 
others with deontic logic.
V.FUTURE WORKS REGARDING THE FORMALIZATION OF THE 
RESPONSIBILITY
Additionally  to  the  Cholvy s  proposition  to  formalize 
responsibility with deontic logic and action logic, our  future 
works extend the formalization of the responsibility with the 
components  of  the  responsibility  tuple  (Capability, 
Accountability  and  Commitment).  The  responsibility  (R) 
assigned to a user (u) to perform a task (t) is written R([t]u). 
Based  upon  our  previous  observations,  we  state  that  this 
formalization  has  one  specificity  that  resides  in  that  the 
components of the responsibility s tuple are at the same time 
conceptual components and modal operators: Capability (CA), 
Accountability  (AC)  and  Commitment  (CO).  We  have 
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consequently to develop a formalization based on the deontic 
logic  to  formalize  the  user  based  formalization  of  the 
responsibility and extend this formalization to predicate logic 
to  represent  the  responsibility  at  an  organization  level.  An 
envisaged  possibility  to  define  responsibility s  modal 
operators  is  to develop the user  based representation of  the 
responsibility  based  on  the  adaptation  of  the  Traditional  
Threefold  Classification  (TTC)  [37].  To  achieve  that,  we 
transpose  Obligatory  to  Accountable  in  that  both  modal 
operators  bring  up  the  notion  of  a  constraint  that  is 
indispensable and makes obligatory by a legal  issue (e.g.:  a 
policy),  we  transpose  Permissible  by  Capable  in  that  both 
defend  the  idea  that  this constraint  permits  an  action  to  be 
performed. And we keep the Optional (OP) modal operator of 
the  standard  deontic  logic  unchanged.  To  achieve  that 
transposition, we need to define the Incapability (IN) and the 
Unaccountability (UN) (see 2  And 3 ). Moreover, equally to 
the  deontic  standard  schema,  the  Fig.  4  highlights  that  the 
three  rectangular  cells  are  jointly  exhaustive  and  mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, each proposition is accountable, optional or 
incapable. Moreover, Capable modal operators are those that 
are either Accountable or Optional and Unaccountable modal 
operators are those that are either Optional or Incapable.
    
Fig.  4.  From  Traditional  toward  a  Responsibility  based  Threefold 
Classification
Based upon the TTC, the  Traditional Definitional Scheme 
(TDS) [37] states by the set of definitions from 1 to 4 that 
something  is  permissible  if  and  only  if  its  negation  is  not 
obligatory,  impermissible  if  and  only  if  its  negation  is 
obligatory,  gratuitous if and only if it  is not  obligatory,  and 
optional if and only if neither it nor its negation is obligatory. 
If we consider that the proposition (p) is the performance of a 
task (t) by a user (u) and is noted [t]u, the set of definitions 
from 1’ to 4’ may defines the concepts of the responsibility 
according to the Responsibility based Threefold Classification.
PEp  ~OB~p .↔
IMp  OB~p .↔
GRp  ~OBp .↔
OPp  (~OBp & ~OB~p) .↔
(0)
(2)
(3)
(4)
CA[t]u  ~AC~ [t]u .↔
IN[t]u  AC~ [t]u .↔
UN[t]u  ~AC[t]u .↔
OP[t]u  (~AC[t]u & ~AC~ [t]u) .↔
(1 )
(2 )
(3’)
(4’)
For achieving a task, u must have the necessary capabilities 
and  be  committed  to  perform  it.  Whether  or  not  he  is 
accountable  do  not  presents  any  impact  on  the  realization. 
Whatever,  not  achieving  a  task  for  which  the  user  is 
accountable may lead to some kind of blame. This aspect is 
not discussed in that paper. 
Fig. 5. Commitment on Responsibility Threefold Classification
Future formalization works will also aims at  defining the 
Commitment. We already suppose that it will be necessary to 
also define it based on the TTC. Fig. 5 shows how it seems 
logic to represent it.
VI.CONCLUSIONS
We  have  analyzed  the  literature  to  understand  the 
semantics  of  AC policy conceptual  models  and  engineering 
methods. We have observed that some elements are commonly 
accepted  components  whereas  others  remain debated  or  not 
addressed. Commonly accepted concepts are user (and related 
ones  such  as  group  or  role),  resource  and  Capability. 
Capability  is  most  frequently  declined  under  access  right, 
authorizations or permissions. Accountability is a concept that 
exists mainly in engineering methods and that is declined as 
the  obligation  to  achieve  a  task  or  to  perform  an  action. 
Commitment is the most infrequent concept. Based upon that 
observation,  we  have  developed  a  conceptual  model  of 
responsibility using an UML class diagram and have defined 
all  the conceptual  components  and clarified some important 
relationships between those.  Thereafter,  to propose a formal 
representation  of  the  model,  we  have  selected  the  suitable 
language  and  logic  system.  The  analyze  highlights  that  an 
important variable is whether the responsibility is perceived at 
a user or at a company level.
In this paper,  the responsibility concept has mainly been 
addressed  based  on  an  IT  approach.  However,  the 
“operational”  and  “management”  fields  are  also  rich  of 
responsibility’s theories [34] and [35]. This area will be the 
focus of our future researches and will permit to refine our first 
findings.  Consequently,  our  future  works  will  focus  on 
continuing the development of the model of responsibility, and 
most specially the concept of Commitment that is important to 
consider  in  high-level  layer  of  the  organizational  model. 
Moreover, defining policy that allows taking into account the 
Commitment opens doors to new approaches that have right 
now poorly be taken into account in traditional and renowned 
risk management solutions
As  a  conclusion  regarding  the  Camerer’s  warning  of 
section II, we have done this analysis to clarify the semantic of 
all components that encompass the responsibility and we may 
consequently state that symptom 1 and 3 identified by Camerer 
has been addressed. Firstly the symptom 1 that is “Concepts 
are often ambiguous and their definitions are not agreed upon” 
has  been  partially  tackled  with  clear  literature-based 
enlightenment  of  the concepts.  Secondly symptom 3  that  is 
“Theories do not ‘cumulate’ or built upon previous theories as 
they should.” has been addresses with a tentative definition of 
“responsibility” considering the way its conceptual component 
are addresses by others authors. 
Another part of our work aims at defining a new approach 
to  derive  the responsibility from the high-level  down to the 
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lower  one.  Our  first  researches  demonstrate  that  potentials 
solutions  are  to  link  responsibility’s  concepts  with 
organization’s  processes.  To  support  the  progress  of  that 
approach, a software prototype has been developed based on 
“egroupware  open  framework”.  Those  researches  and  the 
prototype have been presented in [36].
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